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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
POWELL V. STATE: WHEN THE TRIAL COURT RECORD 
SUFFICIENTL Y DEMONSTRATES THAT A CRIMINAL 
DEFENDANT KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARIL Y WAIVED 
HIS RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL, THE TRIAL JUDGE DOES 
NOT NEED TO STATE ON THE RECORD THAT THE 
DEFENDANT'S WAIVER IS VALID. 
By: Christopher Heagy 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that when the court record 
demonstrates the trial court implicitly determined that a criminal 
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial, 
the trial judge need not state on the record that the defendant 
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. Powell v. 
Maryland, 394 Md. 632, 907 A.2d 242 (2006). In a consolidated 
opinion, the Court held that Maryland Rule 4-246(b) does not compel 
a trial judge to explicitly state that a defendant's waiver of his right to 
a jury trial was knowingly and voluntarily given. Powell, 394 Md. at 
643, 907 A.2d at 249. 
On June 21, 2004, after a bench trial in the Circuit Court for 
Baltimore County, Tavony Wayne Zylanz ("Zylanz") was convicted 
of fourth degree burglary, felony theft, resisting arrest and several 
related offenses. Before Zylanz's bench trial began, his attorney told 
him, in open court, that he could proceed with an agreed statement of 
facts, have a jury trial, or have a bench trial. Zylanz asked questions 
throughout this dialogue and received further explanations from his 
attorney. Zylanz stated he understood his options and decided to have 
a jury trial; however, prior to empanelling the jury, Zylanz told his 
attorney he would like a bench trial. Defense counsel again stated 
Zylanz's options on the record, after which, Zylanz agreed to have a 
bench trial. 
On December 4, 2003, after a bench trial in the Circuit Court for 
Baltimore City, Steven Anthony Powell ("Powell"), was convicted of 
second-degree murder. Before his trial began, Powell's attorney stated 
that Powell had decided to waive his right to a jury trial and sought to 
place Powell's waiver on the court record. On the court record, 
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Powell's attorney explained Powell's options and asked Powell if he 
understood those options. When asked if he wanted a bench or jury 
trial, Powell chose a bench trial. 
In separate opinions, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
affirmed both Zylanz's and Powell's convictions holding that both 
Zylanz and Powell knowingly and voluntarily waived their right to a 
jury trial in conformity with Maryland Rule 4-246(b). The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland granted Zylanz's petition for writ of certiorari to 
determine whether he had validly waived his right to a jury trial absent 
an explicit finding on the record that his waiver was knowingly and 
voluntarily given. The Court granted Powell's petition for writ of 
certiorari to consider the same issue and to consider whether Powell's 
waiver was valid when there was no specific inquiry into the 
voluntariness of his waiver. Although the petitions for writs of 
certiorari were granted and the cases were argued separately before the 
Court, because of the common central issue, both cases were 
consolidated into one opinion. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by stating that 
although both the United States and Maryland Constitutions protect a 
defendant's right to a jury trial, a criminal defendant may waive that 
right. Powell, 394 Md. at 638, 907 A.2d at 246. Maryland Rule 4-
246(b) states a criminal defendant may waive his right to a jury trial 
before his trial begins, as long as the trial court determines, after the 
defendant is examined on the record, that his waiver was knowingly 
and voluntarily given. Powell, 394 Md. at 638-39, 907 A.2d at 246. 
To waive a constitutionally protected right, "the trial judge must be 
satisfied that there has been an intentional relinquishment, or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege." [d. at 639, 907 A.2d at 
246-47 (quoting Smith v. State, 375 Md. 365, 379, 825 A.2d 1055, 
1064 (2003)). Waiver depends on the facts and circumstances of each 
case and the trial court must be satisfied that "the waiver is not a 
product of duress or coercion and further that the defendant has some 
knowledge of the jury trial right" before waiving that right. Powell, 
394 Md. at 639,907 A.2d at 247 (quoting State v. Hall, 321 Md. 178, 
182,582 A.2d 507,509 (1990)). 
The Court then examined the requirements of Maryland Rule 4-
246(b) to determine whether the trial court must place its conclusion 
that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury 
trial on the record. Powell, 394 Md. at 640, 907 A.2d at 247. Looking 
at the plain language of Maryland Rule 4-246(b), the Court decided 
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that while an examination of the defendant must be conducted on the 
record, the language of the Rule does not require that the trial judge 
explicitly state that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived 
his right to a jury trial. Powell, 394 Md. at 641, 907 A.2d at 247. 
In Zylanz's case, based on the totality of the circumstances, 
including Zylanz's conversation with his attorney and his responses to 
the trial judge's questions, the trial judge implicitly determined that 
Zylanz's waiver of his right to a jury trial was knowingly and 
voluntarily given. Id. at 643, 907 A.2d at 248-49. There is a 
presumption that a trial judge knows and properly applies the law. Id. 
at 643, 907 A.2d at 249. As such, the trial judge is not required to 
make an explicit finding that the waiver of a jury trial is knowingly 
and voluntarily made. Id. When the record reflects that the trial court 
implicitly determined that the elements of a knowing and voluntary 
waiver were present, Maryland Rule 4-246(b) is not violated and the 
waiver is valid. Powell, 394 Md. at 643, 907 A.2d at 249. In the 
instant case, the court record sufficiently demonstrated that Zylanz 
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. Id. 
Similarly, based on the conversation between Powell and his attorney 
on the record, the trial judge implicitly determined that Powell 
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. Id. at 644-
48, 907 A.2d at 249-50. 
Finally, Powell argued further that Maryland Rule 4-246(b) was 
violated when there was no specific inquiry into the voluntariness of 
his jury trial waiver. Powell, 394 Md. at 645, 907 A.2d at 250. Trial 
judges are not required, however, to engage in a "specific ritual to 
assess the voluntariness of a defendant's jury trial waiver." Id. 
Absent a factual trigger, which sparks an inquiry into the voluntariness 
of the defendant's jury trial wavier, the trial judge need not explicitly 
ask a defendant whether his waiver was coerced. /d. (citing Kang v. 
State, 393 Md. 97, 899 A.2d 843 (2006». In this case, Powell's 
responses to his attorney's questions on the record did not require the 
trial judge to inquire further as to voluntariness of the waiver. Powell, 
394 Md. at 645, 907 A.2d at 250. 
Judge Greene's dissent argues that the majority's interpretation of 
Maryland Rule 4-246(b) is inconsistent with the Court's interpretation. 
of similarly written rules and that the majority incorrectly interprets 
the rule because the plain meaning of "determine" requires the trial 
judge to state on the record that the defe~dant's waiver was knowingly 
and voluntarily given. Powell, 394 Md. at 648-52, 907 A.2d at 251-55 
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(Greene, J. dissenting). Further, a clear statement by the trial judge on 
the record regarding the defendant's waiver of his right to a jury trial 
would remove any reasonable doubt about the trial judge's finding and 
does not impose a significant burden on the trial court. [d. at 652, 907 
A.2d at 254 (Greene, J. dissenting). 
In Powell v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a 
trial court can implicitly determine that a criminal defendant has 
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. Although 
this decision appears to comply with Maryland Rule 4-246(b), the 
Court seems to ignore the presumption against the waiver of 
fundamental constitutional rights. The waiver of a fundamental 
constitutional right should require an explicit finding by the trial judge 
that such a right was knowingly and voluntarily waived. A more in-
depth inquiry into the defendant's waiver of this right would protect 
the defendant without imposing a significant burden on the trial court. 
